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I. INTRODUCTION
The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act ("EMTALA" or the
"Act")l was passed by Congress in 1986 as part of the Comprehensive Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act ("COBRA").2 EMTALA was enacted to address the
problem of "patient dumping", a practice whereby hospitals either send a
patient in need of medical care to another facility (most often a public hospital)
or simply turn the patient away, due to the patient's inability to pay.3 Congress,
acting in response to its concern over the marked increase in the practice of
1Act of Apr. 7, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-272, Title IX, § 9121, 100 Stat. 164 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1988 & Supp. 1992)).
2 Section 9121 of COBRA amended the Social Security Act (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(a)(1) (1988)), by adding § 1867 to the Social Security Act (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd). See generally Phillip Green, Note, COBRA: Another Patch
on an Old Garment, 33 ST. Louis U. L.J. 743 (1989).
3 Karen I. Treiger, Note, Preventing Patient Dumping: Sharpening the COBRA's Fangs,
61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1186,1187 (1986) (citing Friedman, The "Dumping" Dilemma: The Poor
Are Always with Some of Us, HOSPITALS, Sept. 1, 1982, at 51 ("Depending on who is
describing it, [patient dumping] is known as'transfers of patients for economic reasons',
'demarketing of services', 'management of patient mix', and by other terms. Those who
are less kind call it dumping.")).
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patient dumping by hospitals across the country, enacted EMTALA,4 which
provides certain specific requirements for hospitals for the treatment of
patients in emergency conditions, regardless of their ability to pay.5
Although EMTALA was passed in 1986, there have been relatively few cases
reported which aid in establishing the scope and boundaries of the Act. The
legislature itself has attempted to clarify EMTALA's provisions, and has
amended the Act nearly every year since its enactment, the most recent
amendments in 1990 and the most extensive amendments taking place in 1989.6
These amendments, however, have not changed the Act significantly from its
original purpose and objectives7 and thus, much of the case law remains
4H.R. REP. No. 241, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 27 (1985), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 597,605, states,
The [Ways and Means] Committee is greatly concerned about the
increasing number of reports that hospital emergency rooms are refusing
to accept or treat patients with emergency conditions if the patient does
not have medical insurance. The Committee is most concerned that
medically unstable patients are not being treated appropriately. There have
been reports of situations where treatment was simply not provided. In
numerous other instances, patients in an unstable condition have been
transferred improperly, sometimes without the consent of the receiving
hospital.
5The requirements under EMTALA apply to "participating" hospitals, defined as
those that receive federal funding through a Medicare provider agreement, pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1395cc. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(2) (Supp. 1992). According to statistics
provided by the American Hospital Association and the Health Care Financing
Administration at the time of EMTALA's enactment, approximately 98% of all hospitals
in the United States and its territories are "participating hospitals" within the meaning
of the Act. Treiger, supra note 3, at 1188 n.19.
6The 1989 amendments added three additional sections to EMTALA. The first
provision added under these amendments is a nondiscrimination provision requiring
that a participating hospital with specialized capabilities (such as trauma centers orbum
units) shall not refuse an appropriate transfer of an individual in need of such
capabilities if the hospital has the capacity to treat the individual. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(g)
(Supp. 1992); see Christine A. Fedas et al., Enrgency Treatment Act: A Federal Response
to Patient Dumping, 76 MASS. L. REV. 110,114 (1991). The second provision prohibits the
delay by a participating hospital in providing the required appropriate medical
screening examination or required treatment of a patient in order to inquire about the
patient's insurance status or payment ability. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(h) (Supp. 1992); see
Fedas, supra, at 114. The third provision is a whistleblower provision which protects a
physician against any adverse action taken by a facility in response to a refusal on the
part of the physician to authorize an inappropriate transfer. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(i) (Supp.
1992); see Fedas, supra, at 114. The 1990 amendments extend the whistleblower
protections to qualified medical persons under the Act and to any hospital employee
who reports a violation of the Act. Id.
7See supra note 4. Apart from the substantive additions of the 1989 and 1990
amendments, the amendments to EMTALA have been primarily related to the
clarification of certain terms or phrases used in the Act with respect to the scope of its
requirements. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (Supp. 1992). Throughout these amendments,
EMTALA's overall purpose of ensuring emergency medical treatment for all
individuals, as well as its objectives of deterring hospitals from engagingin the conduct
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pertinent to a current analysis of the application of state medical malpractice
caps to claims under EMTALA.
Part II of this Note examines the current state of the law with respect to
EMTALA's enforcement. Section A of Part II looks at EMTALA itself and
illustrates the differences between the concerns discussed by Congress in the
Act's legislative history and the somewhat ambiguous language of the statute.
This illustration provides the basis for what has resulted in a wide variety of
interpretations of the Act by the judicial system, examples of which are more
closely examined in Section B of Part II - Case Law.
With respect to the applicability of state medical malpractice caps on
damages awarded under EMTALA, further debate continues among the courts
as to what is or should be preempted under the Act, according to EMTALA's
specific preemption provision.8 While some courts believe that EMTALA's
federal cause of action may coincide with any pendent state law medical
malpractice claims or requirements and, therefore, be subject to any state caps
on malpractice damages,9 other courts believe that the incorporation of these
damage caps frustrate the underlying purpose and objectives of EMTALA and
are, therefore, preempted by the Act.10 Due to the relatively few cases reported
which specifically address the issue of state cap applicability, it is necessary to
analyze the judicial system's overall enforcement of EMTALA, which more
clearly defines the boundaries of the Act, in order to make an inference with
respect to the effect of state medical malpractice caps on damages awarded
under EMTALA.
Part III of this Note analyzes the effect of state medical malpractice law on
federal claims under EMTALA, and examines the opposing viewpoints held
by the federal courts on the preemption of these state laws to the extent they
conflict with the enforcement of the provisions of the Act. A final analysis of
EMTALA follows Part III, including an evaluation of the Act's overall
effectiveness since 1986 in addressing the patient dumping epidemic for which
it was enacted.
II. EMTALA AND THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
A. EMTALA
EMTALA was passed by Congress in 1986.11 Through its enactment,
Congress attempted to address the issue of patient dumping by requiring
proscribed under the Act and compensating victims of such prohibited conduct, have
remained unchanged. See generally Fedas, supra note 6, at 113-14.
842 U.S.C. § 1395dd(f) (1988). Subsection (f) of EMTALA provides as follows: 'The
provisions of this section do not preempt any State or local law requirement, except to
the extent that the requirement directly conflicts with a requirement of this section." Id.
9See infra notes 97-109 and accompanying text.
10See infra notes 110-115 and accompanying text.
1994]
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1994
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
participating hospitals 12 to adhere to certain provisions as set forth in the Act.
The first section of EMTALA requires a participating hospital to 'provide an
"appropriate medical screening" to any individual who comes to such hospital
seeking treatment.13 More specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) requires:
[I]f any individual . . . comes to the emergency department and a
request is made on the individual's behalf for examination or treatment
for a medical condition, the hospital must provide for an appropriate
medical screening examination within the capability of the hospital's
emergency department ... to determine whether or not an emergency
medical condition... exists.
14
The statute does not define "appropriate medical screening." Such definition
has been left to the judiciary to determine. 15
An "emergency medical condition" under the statute is defined as:
(A) a medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of
sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that the absence of
immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to result
in -
(i) placing the health of the individual (or, with respect to a
pregnant woman, the health of the woman or her unborn
child) in serious jeopardy,
(ii) serious impairment to bodily functions, or
(iii) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part; or
1142 U.S.C. § 1395dd (Supp. 1992) (Table 1); see supra notes 1-5 and accompanying
text.
12Under EMTALA, a "participating hospital" is defined as a "hospital that has entered
into a [Medicare] provider agreement under section 1395cc of this title." 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395dd(e)(2) (Supp. 1992); see supra note 5.
1342 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (Supp. 1992). Although no definition is included in the statute
as to what constitutes an "appropriate" medical screening, the language following this
term, which refers to such appropriate screening as that which is "within the capability
of the hospital's emergency department," has led some courts to conclude that a
subjective standard should be applied to determine a violation of this section of the Act.
Id.; see also infra note 88.
14 Unlike the standard of care which is applied in cases concerning negligence or
medical malpractice, most courts have determined that the use of the term "appropriate"
in this subsection does not focus on the outcome of the examination performed by the
hospital but, instead, concerns itself with whether or not the examination performed
was considered standard procedure by thehospital. In this respect, a subjective standard
would be applied to determine a hospital's liability under the Act. See infra note 88.
15 0ne of the most recent examples of this is found in Cleland v. Bronson Health Care
Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 272 (6th Cir. 1990). In Cleland, the court determined that the
term "appropriate", as used in the requirements of subsection (a) of EMTALA, would
be defined by means of a subjective standard rather than the objective standard of a
malpractice-based claim. Id.; see infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
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(B) with respect to a pregnant woman who is having contractions -
(i) that there is inadequate time to effect a safe transfer to
another hospital before delivery, or
(ii) that transfer may pose a threat to the health or safety of the
woman or the unborn child.
16
If an emergency medical condition is determined to exist within the meaning
of § 1395dd(e)(1), the participating hospital must then follow the requirements
of subsection (b)(l) of the Act. This subsection offers the hospital two options:
"(A) within the staff and facilities available at the hospital, for such further
medical examination and such treatment as may be required to stabilize17 the
medical condition, or (B) for transfer of the individual to another medical
facility in accordance with subsection (c) of this section."18
Should the hospital choose to transfer the patient to another facility,
EMTALA provides certain requirements to be followed by the transferring
hospital in order to effectuate a proper transfer.19 These requirements include
1642 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1) (Supp. 1992). This section somewhat overlaps the elements
of a traditional medical malpractice action as, although the subsection delineates the
various types of medical emergencies, an inadequate screening by a hospital resulting
in the failure to identify one of these conditions (conduct which could be found to
constitute negligence in a local malpractice action) would not violate the requirements
of the Act, if the screening performed conformed to the hospital's own standards. See
infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
17
"To stabilize" is defined as "to provide such medical treatment of the condition as
may be necessary to assure, within reasonable medical probability, that no material
deterioration of the condition is likely to result from or occur during the transfer of the
individual from a facility or . . . to deliver (including the placenta)." 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395dd(e)(3) (Supp. 1992).
1842 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1) (1988 & Supp. 1992). Subsection (c) prohibits a hospital
from transferring a patient if a patient has not been stabilized (within the meaning of
the Act) unless (i) the patient requests the transfer in writing, after being informed of
the hospital's obligations and of the risk of such transfer; (ii) a physician determines that
the "medical benefits reasonably expected from the [transfer] outweigh the increased
risks to the individual"; or (iii) in the absence of a physician at the time of transfer, a
qualified medical person (as defined in the Act's corresponding regulations), following
a prior consultation with the physician, signs a certification of the physician's
determination under clause (ii) which is subsequently countersigned by such
authorizing physician. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(1)(A) (Supp. 1992).
1942 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(1)-(2) (1988 & Supp. 1992). If an individual is found to have
an emergency medical condition under subsection (a) of the Act, subsection (c)(1)
prohibits the hospital from transferring the individual (including a discharge) if that
individual has not been stabilized, unless,
(A)(i) the individual ... after being informed of the hospital's obligations
under this section and of the risk of transfer, in writing requests transfer
to another medical facility,
(ii) a physician... has signed a certification that.., the medical benefits
reasonably expected from the provision of appropriate medical treatment
at another medical facility outweight the increased risks to the individual
... or
1994]
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such procedural elements as the procurement of a confirmation of availability
for and acceptance of the transfer patient by the receiving hospital, the transfer
of all medical records to the receiving hospital, and the requirement to provide
qualified equipment and personnel during such transfer, as well as a subjective
determination that the transferring hospital has provided medical treatment to
the patient "which [will minimize] the risks to the individual's health....'20
A participating hospital may, then, violate EMTALA by either (i) failing to
provide an "appropriate medical screening," as required under subsection (a),
or, should an emergency medical condition be detected by the hospital's initial
screening, (ii) failing to either stabilize or effectuate an appropriate transfer
within the requirements delineated in subsections (b) and (c) of the Act.21
Liability for these violations is addressed by EMTALA's enforcement
provisions.
(iii) if a physician is not physically present in the emergency department at
the time an individual is transferred, a qualified medical person ... has
signed a certification described in clause (ii) after a physician... in consul-
tation with the person, has made the determination described in such
clause, and subsequently countersigns the certification; and (B) the
transfer is an appropriate transfer (within the meaning of paragraph
(2)) to that facility.
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(1)-(2) (1988 & Supp. 1992).
2042 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(2) (Supp. 1992). Specifically, subsection (c)(2) sets forth the
procedural elements of an appropriate transfer under the Act, which is primarily a
transfer:
(A) in which the transferring hospital provides the medical treatment
within its capacity which minimizes the risks to the individual's health...;(B) in which the receiving facility -
(i) has available space and qualified personnel for the treatment of
the individual, and
(ii) has agreed to accept transfer of the individual and to provide
appropriate medical treatment;
(C) in which the transferring hospital sends to the receiving facility all
medical records ... related to the emergency condition for which the
individual has presented [him/herself], available at the time of transfer,
... and the name and address of any on-call physician... who has refused
or failed to appear within a reasonable time to provide necessary stabilizing
treatment;
(D) in which the transfer is effected through qualified personnel and trans-
portation equipment, as required including the use of necessary and
medically appropriate life support measures during the transfer;(E) which meets such other requirements as the Secretary may find
necessary in the interest of the health and safety of individuals transferred.
Id.
2142 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a)-(c) (1988 & Supp. 1992). Recent interpretations of EMTALA
by the Sixth Circuit have concluded that the language of the Act indicates that a
hospital's stabilizing requirements are activated only when an emergency medical
condition is detected during the hospital's initial medical screening examination. See
infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text. If a hospital fails to detect such a condition in
its "appropriate" screening, it cannot be held liable under EMTALA's stabilizing
requirements. See infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
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The enforcement provisions of EMTALA, as amended, include both civil
money penalties and private causes of action.22 Under the civil money penalties
provision, negligent violations of EMTALA's requirements, by either a
hospital, a physician, or both, are subject to money penalties not to exceed
$50,000.23 In addition, EMTALA provides for the exclusion of a physician from
both state and federally funded health care programs for "gross and flagrant"
or repeated violations of the Act.24
EMTALA's provision for civil enforcement of the Act offers two possible
private causes of action under the statute. These causes of action attempt to
accommodate the relief sought by either (i) an individual who is harmed by a
hospital acting in violation of the Act or (ii) a medical facility that experiences
a financial loss as a result of a participating hospital's violation of the Act.
Specifically, sections (d)(2)(A)-(B) provide as follows:
(A) Personal harm
Any individual who suffers personal harm as a direct result of a
participating hospital's violation of a requirement of this section may,
in a civil action against the participating hospital, obtain those damages
available forpersonal injury under the law of the State in which the hospital
is located, and such equitable relief as is appropriate.
(B) Financial loss to other medical facility
Any medical facility that suffers a financial loss as a direct result of a
participating hospital's violation of a requirement of this section may,
in a civil action against the participating hospital, obtain those
2242 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d) (Supp. 1992). The civil money penalties are imposed by the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services for negligent violations of any
EMTALA requirement. Id. With respect to physicians, the enforcement provisions of
subsection (d)(1) allow for the imposition of civil money penalties by the Secretary of
the Department of Health and Human Services to
... any physician who is responsible for the examination, treatment, or
transfer of an individual, ... and who negligently violates a requirement
of [the Act], including a physician who -
(i) signs a certification under subsection (c)(l)(A) of this section that the
medical benefits... expected from a transfer to another facility outweigh
the risks associated with the transfer, if the physician knew or should have
known that the benefits did not outweigh the risks, or
(ii) misrepresents an individual's condition or other information, including
a hospital's obligations under the section.
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1) (Supp. 1992).
2342 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1) (Supp. 1992). The 1990 amendments lowered such penalty
to $25,000 for violating hospitals which have fewer than 100 beds. Id.
2442 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1)(B) (Supp. 1992). The courts have determined that a
hospital also may have its Medicare provider agreement terminated; however, such
sanction may not be sought in a private cause of action under the Act but, instead, must
be imposed at the initiative of the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Deberry v.
Sherman Hosp. Ass'n, 775 F. Supp. 1159,1162 (N.D. I1. 1991).
1994]
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damages available for financial loss, under the law of the State in which
25the hospital is located, and such equitable relief as is appropriate.
An individual or facility asserting a claim under EMTALA must do so within
a two-year period from the date of the alleged violation.26
Finally, the preemption provision of EMTALA is worth noting as this
provision directly affects the applicability of state laws limiting medical
malpractice damages to damages awarded pursuant to EMTALA. Subsection
(f) of EMTALA deals with preemption and sets forth that the "provisions of this
section [1395dd] do not preempt any State or local law requirement, except to
the extent that the requirement directly conflicts with a requirement of this
section."27 The courts are split as to whether the application of state medical
malpractice caps "directly conflicts" with EMTALA and is therefore preempted,
or whether such an application does not conflict and, therefore, may be
permitted to limit damages awarded under EMTALA. A detailed examination
of case law with respect to EMTALA is in order to understand the varied
interpretations of this statute, as well as the theories presented in addressing
the issue of the applicability of state medical malpractice caps on damages
awarded under EMTALA.
B. Case Law
Relatively few cases have been brought under EMTALA since its enactment
in 1986. With few decisions determining the scope of the relief granted under
the Act in the early years of its enforcement, some differences in opinion exist
as to what constitutes a valid claim under EMTALA. One of the principal
differences among EMTALA decisions involves the issue of whether or not an
economic motive must be present in an EMTALA claim.28 Due to the scarcity
of EMTALA reported opinions, courts have often looked outside their own
jurisdictions to find support for rendering a decision under EMTALA. This
section will examine the fundamental theories behind EMTALA's leading cases
to understand the cause of action created by EMTALA for purposes of
addressing the issue of this Note, that is, the applicability of a state law's
medical malpractice damages cap to damages awarded under EMTALA.
1. Strict Interpretation of the Statute
One of the schools of thought with respect to EMTALA favors a strict reading
of the text of the statute for its interpretation, giving no relevance to the
legislative history involved in its enactment. Interestingly, by limiting their
2542 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A)--(B) (Supp. 1992) (emphasis added).
2642 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(C) (Supp. 1992).
2742 U.S.C. § 1395dd(f) (1988).
28 See Thomas L. Stricker, Jr., Note, The Emergency Medical Treatment & Active Labor
Act: Denial of Emergency Medical Care Because of Improper Economic Motives, 67 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1121 (1992).
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reading of the statute to its actual text only, thereby ignoring EMTALA's
legislative history in defining the Act's purpose and objectives in enforcing its
provisions, these courts have actually broadened the scope of EMTALA in their
determination that the phrase "any individual" (used throughout the Act)
serves to expand EMTALA's protections to all individuals, not solely the
indigent or uninsured.29
In Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp.,30 the plaintiff's husband
presented himself to the defendant's emergency room, complaining of pain in
his chest and down his left arm.31 Following an exam, blood tests, a chest x-ray
and an EKG test, the plaintiff's husband was sent home.32 The following
morning the plaintiff's husband died of a heart attack.33 The plaintiff brought
an action against the hospital under EMTALA along with pendent local claims
for malpractice.34
The defendants argued that no EMTALA claim existed because the plaintiff's
husband was fully insured and the Act was intended to provide "emergency
room access to uninsured and indigent patients only. 35 The Gatewood court
interpreted the statute strictly, finding that, despite a legislative history noting
concern for the treatment of indigent patients, EMTALA's specific language
extended protection to "any individual" and thus refused to dismiss the claim
based on the economic status of the claimant.36 The strict interpretation of
EMTALA found in Gatewood is followed by several courts, including many
outside the D.C. Circuit.
37
29 See infra notes 30-47 and accompanying text.
30933 F.2d 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
311d. at 1039.
32 1d. The diagnosis of the attending physician was that the plaintiff's husband was
suffering from musculoskeletal pain. He was discharged with instructions to take
Tylenol pain medication, use a heating pad, and contact his personal physician in the
morning. Id.
33 Gatewood, 933 F.2d at 1039.
34 Id. at 1038.
3 5Id. at 1040.
3 6
"Though the Emergency Act's legislative history reflects an unmistakable concern
with the treatment of uninsured patients, the Act itself draws no distinction between
persons with and without insurance. Rather the Act's plain language unambiguously
extends its protections to 'any individual' who seeks emergency room assistance." Id.
(citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd(a), (b)(1) (emphasis added)). The EMTALA claim, however,
wasdismissed by thecourt upon its ruling that theallegationsof the plaintiff's complaint
were traditional state-based claims of negligence or malpractice and were simply not
cognizable under the Act. Gatewood, 933 F.2d at 1041.
37 See Brooker v. Desert Hosp. Corp., 947 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1991); Mitchell v. Candler
Gen. Hosp., Inc., No. CV 491-258, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5997 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 2, 1992);
Urban v. King, 783 F. Supp. 560 (D. Kan. 1992); Jones v. Wake County Hosp. Sys., Inc.,
786 F. Supp. 538 (E.D.N.C. 1991).
1994]
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In Deberry v. Sherman Hospital Association,38 a claim was asserted under the
stabilizing requirement of EMTALA.39 The plaintiff's daughter had been
brought to defendant's emergency room with various symptoms of spinal
meningitis, including fever, rash, stiff neck, and her head tilted to the left.40
Although she did receive treatment at the emergency room, the plaintiff's
daughter was discharged and was not diagnosed with spinal meningitis until
two days later, after her condition worsened, ultimately causing deafness. 4 1
In ruling out a requirement of indigence for a cause of action under
EMTALA, the Deberry court, while recognizing that "perhaps the principal
reason for [EMTALA's] enactment was the refusal to treat indigents by certain
hospitals," decided that "the language of the statute quite plainly goes further.
Thus, it nowhere mentions either indigency, an inability to pay, or the hospital's
motive as a prerequisite to statutory coverage."42 Deberry, therefore, refused to
expand the requirements of a cause of action under EMTALA by allowing the
language of the legislative history of the Act, concerning improper economic
motives on the part of hospitals refusing to treat patients, to be read into the
language of the statute itself.
Such strict reading of the statute continued in Burditt v. United States
Department of Health and Human Services.43 In Burditt, a physician who was fined
under the civil money penalties provision of EMTALA44 challenged this
sanction. The plaintiff physician was found to have previously violated the
transfer provisions of EMTALA45 when he ordered a hypertensive woman in
active labor to travel to another hospital because he did not want to take the
38741 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
391d.; see 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1) (Supp. 1992). Count I of the plaintiff's complaint
alleged that the defendant, by discharging the plaintiff's daughter without stabilizing
her medical condition, had violated subsection (b)(1) of the Act. 741 F. Supp. at 1303;see
also supra notes 17 and 18 and accompanying text.
40741 F. Supp. at 1303. Additional symptoms noted in the complaint included
"dispositional aberrations" involving irritability and lethargy. Id.
4 1id.
42 1d. at 1306.
43934 F.2d 1362 (5th Cir. 1991). This action is somewhat different from the other cases
examined in this section as it involves a civil enforcement proceeding under subsection
(d)(1) of the Act rather than a private cause of action under subsection (d)(2). Id. A
similarity, however, is found between the assertions made by the plaintiff in his
challenge to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and the defenses raised
by defendants in the various private causes of action brought under EMTALA. These
assertions with respect to the Department's earlier sanctions imposed against the
plaintiff included the argument that an improper (economic) motive must be proven as
an element of any EMTALA violation. Id. at 1373.
4442 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1) (Supp. 1992).
4542 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c) (1988 & Supp. 1992); see supra notes 19 and 20.
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risk of performing the delivery.4 6 The Burditt court imposed a strict
interpretation of the statute and declined to incorporate a showing of improper
economic motive for an EMTALA violation.
47
Overall, the courts which have held to a strict interpretation of the Act have
served to expand its enforcement with respect to the classes of patients
protected by its provisions. As a result of this interpretation, whereby the courts
have chosen to disregard EMTALA's legislative history, a cause of action is not
limited by a necessary showing of economic motive on the part of the violating
physician or hospital.
2. Liberal Interpretation of the Statute
In addition to examining the text of the statute, some courts have chosen to
review its legislative history in order to interpret EMTALA's requirements.
These courts give credence to such history by finding an additional
requirement of economic motive, a showing of which is essential to a cause of
action under the Act.
One of the earlier cases which tested the scope of EMTALA was Nichols v.
Estabrook.48 The Nichols court looked to the legislative history of EMTALA to
determine the validity of the plaintiffs' contention that a physician's
misdiagnosis of the plaintiffs' baby violated a standard of conduct established
by EMTALA, the violation of which thus constituted negligence per se.49 The
plaintiffs' baby had been examined in an emergency room by the defendant
who failed to detect the existence of an emergency medical condition.50 The
baby died a few hours later.51
Upon reviewing the legislative history of EMTALA, the court determined
that the statute was enacted by Congress as an attempt to ensure emergency
46934 F.2d at 1366-67. Part of the evidence presented of the plaintiff's violation of the
Act's transfer requirements included the authorization certificate which had been
signed by the plaintiff but contained no explanation for the patient's transfer. Id. at 1367.
Court testimony revealed that the plaintiff had remanded to the nursing supervisor (in
reference to the explanation section which had been left blank) that "until [the hospital]
pays my malpractice insurance, I will pick and choose those patients that I want to treat."
Id.
47The court noted that, "[als written, EMTALA prevents patient dumping without
such a requirement[,] and thus refused to "alter the statutory scheme [of the Act]." Id.
at 1373.
48741 F. Supp. 325 (D.N.H. 1989).
491d. at 329.
501d. at 326; see supra note 16 and accompanying text.
51741 F. Supp. at 326. Prior to the baby's death, the defendant had advised the
plaintiffs to take their baby toanother hospital where, he told them, a pediatrician would
be waiting. Upon the plaintiffs' arrival at the second hospital, however, an emergency
code was immediately called by the receiving pediatrics nurse while the pediatrician,
who was said to have been waiting for the plaintiffs, did not arrive until 35 to 40 minutes
later, approximately five minutes before the baby's death. Id.
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treatment despite economic resources and to put an end to the practice of
patient dumping.52 As patient dumping was the conduct EMTALA sought to
eliminate, the plaintiffs, in its assertion that the defendant's alleged
misdiagnosis had violated the Act (without any such showing of patient
dumping on the part of the defendant), did not provide the basis for negligence
per se.53 The Nichols court held that "[t]he interest which Congress sought to
protect by enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd was not invaded by the defendant's
conduct as here alleged," which, therefore, precluded the plaintiffs' assertion
of any negligence per se theory of liability.54
Another "misdiagnosis" complaint brought under EMTALA which led to a
liberal interpretation of the statute is found in Evitt v. University Heights
Hospital.55 The plaintiff in this action was examined in the emergency room of
the defendant hospital for complaints of severe chest pain. She was discharged
with instructions for home treatment and returned later the same day, having
suffered a heart attack.56 In her complaint, plaintiff alleged that the initial
failure by the defendant to detect her serious condition violated the
"appropriate medical screening" requirement under 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a).57 In
establishing whether or not the defendant had indeed violated EMTALA, the
court looked to the Act's legislative history58 and determined that, because the
statute is "specifically directed toward preventing prospective patients from
being turned away for economic reasons,"59 the plaintiff's interpretation of
"appropriate" attempted to expand its statutorial meaning and, instead, more
closely resembled a definition related to a medical malpractice claim.60 The
52Id. at 329-30. In addition to its review of EMTALA's legislative history, the court
also made reference to the significant amount of media attention which was gained by
the patient dumping issue at the time of the Congressional proceedings prior to
EMTALA's enactment, providing further indication of the Act's Congressional intent.
Id.
53
"A claim of negligence may be founded on a failure to satisfy such a standard of
conduct 'when the consequences contemplated by the statute have actually resulted
from the violation."' Id. at 329 (quoting Collier v. Redbones Tavern & Restaurant, Inc.,
601 F. Supp. 927,931 (D.N.H. 1985)); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 cmt.
b (1965).
54741 F. Supp. at 330.
55727 F. Supp. 495 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
561d. at 496.
5 71d. In addition, the plaintiff alleged alternative violations by the defendant of
subsections (b) or (c) of EMTALA, also alleged to have occurred during her first visit,
by the defendant's failure to stabilize the plantiff's condition or properly transfer her to
another facility. Id.
581d. at 496-97.
59727 F. Supp. at 497 (citing Reid v. Indianapolis Osteopathic Medical Hosp., 709 F.
Supp. 853 (S.D. Ind. 1989)).
60727 F. Supp. at 497. As the court stated, "[cilaims regarding diagnosis and treatment
lie in the area of medical malpractice, an area traditionally regulated by state law. To
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court ultimately held that such an allegation went beyond the scope of
EMTALA, which seeks only to prevent patient dumping through "specifically
tailored hospital requirements" and "presents no direct conflict to general
principles of state medical malpractice law." 6 1
Stewart v. Myrick62 is one of the leading cases supporting the more liberal
interpretation of EMTALA. In Stewart, the plaintiff's husband arrived at the
emergency room with apparent complaints of chest pain, loss of color, and
shortness of breath.63 After seeing the defendant doctor, the plaintiff's husband
was sent home and scheduled for various tests which were conducted two days
later. These tests were inconclusive and the plaintiff's husband was released;
he did not seek further treatment until approximately eight days later, when
he arrived at the facility by ambulance and died shortly thereafter.64
In her claim for relief under EMTALA, the plaintiff alleged violations of both
its screening and transfer provisions.65 Citing extensive legislative history to
support its interpretation of the statute,66 the Stewart court dismissed the
plaintiff's EMTALA claim because it did not "represent a case of patient
dumping, in which the plaintiff was turned away from medical care for
economic reasons" and, thus, did not "present the type of evil that Congress
sought to eliminate in the Act."67 The findings of Stewart have been followed
adjudicate these issues under the anti-dumping provision would lead to federal
preemption not contemplated under this Act." Id.
6id. The court noted that the statutorial interpretation proposed by the plaintiffs in
their argument would, in effect, lead to a result which would allow any patient
dissatisfied with an emergency room diagnosis and release to file an action for recovery
of damages under the anti-dumping provisions of EMTALA. This interpretation, the
court offered, "would, in effect, make the hospital the guarantor of the physicians'
diagnosis and treatment, irrespective of how reasonable such diagnosis [or treatment]
may have appeared at the time [it was administered]...." Id. The Evitt court concluded
that EMTALA does not go this far. Id.
62731 F. Supp. 433 (D. Kan. 1990).
63 Id. at 434. The defendant contended that the plaintiff did not make such complaints
either to the defendant or to his nurse. Id.
64 Id.
6 51d. at 434-35 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a)-(b)(1) (Supp. 1992)).
66731 F. Supp. at 435 (citing Treiger, supra note 3). The court also cited to the several
committee reports and debates noted at H.R. REP. No. 241, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1,
at 27 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 597, 605; 131 CONG. REc. H9503 (daily ed.
Oct. 31,1985); 131 CONG. REc. S13,903 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1985), which provide evidence
of Congress' intent behind EMTALA's enactment. Primarily, the Stewart court observed
that the legislators had stressed that the underlying purpose of the Act was to "ensure
that indigent persons were not denied emergency health care due to their financial
status." Id.
6 71d. at 436. As in the holding of Evitt v. University Heights Hosp., 727 F. Supp. 495
(S.D. Ind. 1989), the court in Stewart found that the plaintiff's claim "[fell] within the
ambit of state negligence law, not the federal anti-dumping law[,]" and, since there was
1994]
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by other jurisdictions seeking support for their more liberal reading of
EMTALA, in order to uphold, in enforcing the Act, the principles which
originally motivated its enactment by Congress.68 In contrast to the expansive
class of patients protected under the strict interpretation of EMTALA, a liberal
interpretation of the Act, which permits the legislative history of the statute to
be considered in determining its application, narrows its coverage to protect
only those patients who are indigent or uninsured.
3. Sixth Circuit Alternative
The Sixth Circuit has combined the previous strict and liberal interpretations
of EMTALA by prior courts to provide an alternative reading of the statute,
recognizing the legislative history of the Act in addressing the problem of
patient dumping without limiting claims to those with a showing of economic
motive. The Sixth Circuit accomplishes this by focusing its examination of
EMTALA claims on the refusal or denial of treatment rather than inadequate
treatment or mistreatment as the basis for recovery under the Act, while
expanding the definition of patient dumping to include refusals of treatment
by hospitals for any reason, not solely economic.69
In Thornton v. Southwest Detroit Hospital,70 one of the earlier Sixth Circuit
decisions regarding EMTALA, the plaintiff was admitted to the defendant
hospital after suffering a stroke.71 Following a lengthy stay in the hospital,
consisting of ten days in the intensive care unit of the hospital followed by an
additional eleven days in regular care, the plaintiff was discharged by her
doctor to her sister's home when a local rehabilitation center refused to accept
her for therapy.72 The plaintiff's condition deteriorated at home, and she was
no direct conflict between such local law and the federal law in question, preemption
of the local law pursuant to subsection (f) of the Act was precluded. Id.
68 See Coleman v. McCurtain Memorial Medical Management, Inc., 771 F. Supp. 343
(E.D. Okla. 1991); Owens v. Nacogdoches County Hosp. Dist., 741 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D.
Tex. 1990).
69 See Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, 917 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1990); Thornton
v. Southwest Detroit Hosp., 895 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1990). In Thornton, for example, the
court interpreted EMTALA as simply requiring a hospital to screen individuals who
come to its emergency department to determine whether they suffer from an emergency
condition; if such a condition is found to exist, the hospital must provide treatment to
stabilize the condition unless the patient can be transferred without danger of the
condition deteriorating. 895 F.2d at 1134. The Cleland court expanded these
requirements through its own interpretation of the Act that both the screening and
treatment to be provided by the hospital must be such as would be provided to any
paying patient. 917 F.2d at 268-69.
70895 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1990).
7 lId. at 1132.
72 Id. The rehabilitation center refused to accept the plaintiff because her health
insurance would not cover the cost. Il. Although this appears to be a blatant denial of
medical treatment of an uninsured patient in direct violation of EMTALA, the
rehabilitation center is not the type of medical facility which is subject to the
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finally admitted to the local rehabilitation center more than three months after
her discharge.73
In her lawsuit against the hospital, the plaintiff in Thornton alleged that the
hospital had violated the stabilizing requirements of EMTALA 74 by
transferring (discharging) her in a condition which, according to the provisions
of the statute, was likely to materially deteriorate as a result of such transfer.75
The defendant argued that EMTALA governed the activities of a hospital in its
emergency treatment facilities only, citing the repeated use of the term
"emergency room" in the Act's legislative history as evidence of this
contention. 76 The court, however, arrived at a different conclusion upon its
examination of EMTALA and its corresponding legislative history. The
Thornton court observed that the Act did not limit its requirements to
emergency rooms only, but that the more likely intent of Congress in enacting
EMTALA was to "insure that patients with medical emergencies would receive
emergency care,"77 wherever such emergencies may occur within a
participating hospital. The court noted that the need for "emergency care does
not always stop when a patient is wheeled ... into the main hospital."78
It is this somewhat simple and straightforward summary of EMTALAby the
Thornton court which later provided the foundation for a refining of the Sixth
Circuit's alternative interpretation of EMTALA in Cleland v. Bronson Health Care
Group, Inc.79 The court in Cleland combined the previous strict and liberal
interpretations of EMTALA by federal courts into a balanced alternative
reading of the statute which has since been followed more consistently than
either of the prior readings of the Act.80 In Cleland, the plaintiffs brought their
requirements of EMTALA and, therefore, could not be joined as a defendant in this
action. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(2) (Supp. 1992).
73895 F.2d at 1132.
7442 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1), (c) (1988 & Supp. 1992).
7542 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(3)(A) (Supp. 1992). According to subsection (e)(4) of the Act,
a transfer is defined as the "movement (including the discharge) of an individual outside
a hospital's facilities at the direction of any person employed by... the hospital[.]" 42
U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(4) (Supp. 1992).
76895 F.2d at 1135.
77 1d.
781d. The Thorn ton court stated that emergency care must be given by a hospital until
the patient's emergency condition stabilizes, recognizing that, contrary to theconclusion
to be drawn from the argument presented by the defendant, a hospital "may not
circumvent the requirements of the Act merely by admitting an emergency room patient
to the hospital, then immediately discharging that patient." Id.
79917 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1990).
80 See Collins v. DePaul Hosp., 963 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1992) (plaintiff's non-indigent
status does not defeat his claim underEMTALA); Power v. Arlington Hosp., 800 F. Supp.
1384 (E.D. Va. 1992) (patient dumping provisions of EMTALA were not intended to
supplant state malpractice remedies); Jones v. Wake County Hosp. Sys., Inc., 786 F.
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15-year-old son to the defendant's emergency room where he, after
complaining of cramps and vomiting, was diagnosed with influenza and
discharged four hours later.81 This diagnosis, however, was incorrect and, in
actuality, the plaintiffs' son was suffering from intussusception, a condition
whereby a part of the intestine telescopes within itself, and he suffered cardiac
arrest and died less than 24 hours later.82
The plaintiffs brought their subsequent action against the hospital under the
"appropriate medical screening" requirement of EMTALA in addition to a
pendent medical malpractice claim.83 The district court had originally
dismissed the action under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, based on its finding that EMTALA applied to indigent and
uninsured patients only.84 The Cleland court upheld the district court's
dismissal of the case, but on different grounds.85 The court agreed with the
district court's finding that EMTALA was enacted to address the increasing
problem of hospitals' alleged failure to treat patients based solely on the
patient's financial inadequacy and was not intended to be used as a general
malpractice action.86 However, it was the Cleland court's interpretation of the
phrases "appropriate medical screening" and "emergency medical condition"
which led to its affirming the district court's dismissal.
87
The Cleland court reviewed the legislative history of EMTALA and
determined that "appropriateness" in the sense required by EMTALA "must
more correctly be interpreted to refer to the motives with which the hospital
Supp. 538, 544 (E.D.N.C. 1991) (EMTALA not intended to redress a hospital's
misdiagnosis, but is "merely an entitlement to receive the same treatment that is
accorded to others similarly situated"); Lee v. Alleghany Regional Hosp. Corp., 778 F.
Supp. 900 (W.D. Va. 1991) (claim may be stated under the Act without alleging that
denial of treatment was based on inability to pay); Petrovics v. Prince William Hosp.
Corp., 764 F. Supp. 415 (E.D. Va. 1991) ("appropriate" screening determined with regard
to the hospital's own standard of care provided to any patient); Burrows v. Turner
Memorial Hosp., Inc., 762 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Ark. 1991) (indigency not a requirement
for a statement of claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd); Smith v. Richmond Memorial Hosp.,
416 S.E.2d 689 (Va. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 442 (1992) (language of the Act broadened
its coverage to expand beyond indigents).
81917 F.2d at 268.
82Id.
831d.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (1988 & Supp. 1992).
84917 F.2d at 268.
8 5Id. Although the Cleland court agreed with the district court finding that the
plaintiffs had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, it found that
this failure by the plaintiffs occurred with respect to the meaning behind the appropriate
medical screening requirement, and not because of any requirement of indigence. Id. at
268-69.
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acts."88 It is here that the Sixth Circuit expanded the previous liberal
interpretations of EMTALA which upheld an economic motive requirement for
claims under the Act by its refusal to disregard any other motives that a hospital
may have when it has engaged in patient dumping activity. Instead, the Cleland
court found, in determining the Act, that EMTALA speaks only to the
differential treatment of patients rather than the mistreatment or misdiagnosis
of such patients, and concluded that "[a] hospital that provides substandard
(by its standards) or nonexistent medical screenings for any reason... may be
liable under this section."89
The Cleland court continued its alternative interpretation of EMTALA by
limiting the stabilizing requirements of the Act to those situations where an
"emergency medical condition" (as defined in the Act) has been discovered by
the hospital's screening exam.90 According to its holding, the Cleland court
found that "[i]f the condition was not ascertained even though an appropriate
screening was provided, then the hospital could not have violated its duty to
stabilize."9 1
The significance of this holding, that the stabilizing duties under EMTALA
are "triggered" only upon the discovery of an emergency condition, lies with
the realization that, in effect, conduct by a hospital which may be deemed
"inappropriate" by a local negligence standard may be held to be "appropriate"
under EMTALA and thus in compliance with the requirements of the Act.
92
This interpretation by the Sixth Circuit provides the basis for its finding that
EMTALA claims and state malpractice claims are mutually exclusive causes of
action; a showing of the required elements of a local malpractice cause of action
88917 F.2d at 272. The court refers to the statute's language, with respect to the
appropriate screening requirement, of "within its capabilities" as precluding a
negligence or objective standard of care to determine what is "appropriate" for purposes
of determining a basis for relief under the Act. Id.
891d. at 272 (emphasis added). In illustrating this finding, the court noted that a
patient may be refused treatment by a hospital for a number of reasons in addition to
economic, including race, drunkenness, AIDS, etc., all of which, by the court's reasoning,
would be prohibited under the Act. The court concluded from the evidence presented
that the treatment received by the plaintiffs' son would have been given to any other
patient of any other characteristics and, therefore, was not "inappropriate" by the
hospital's-standards as to have violated the requirements of EMTALA. Id. at 271.
90917 F.2d at 271.
911d. at 271 n.2.
92 Thomton v. Southwest Detroit Hosp., 895 F.2d 1131,1133 (6th Cir. 1990) ("A cause
of action under the Act is not analogous to a state medical malpractice claim because it
creates liability for a refusal to treat, which state malpractice law does not."); see also
Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
("[T]here may be some instances in which a hospital's normal screening procedure will
fall below the standard of care established by local negligence or malpractice law.
Nevertheless, we decline the... invitation to incorporate a malpractice or negligence
standard into subsection 1395dd(a).").
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may not necessarily contain those elements essential to a federal cause of action
under the Act.93
The opinion that malpractice claims and EMTALA claims are distinct and
mutually exclusive causes of action is commonly held among the majority of
the courts that have heard cases brought under the Act.94 This belief,
considered in conjunction with an analysis of (i) EMTALA's language
concerning damages and (ii) the findings of the limited number of cases
addressing the issue of the effect of state medical malpractice law on claims
asserted under the Act, provide the foundation for a determination that the
application of state medical malpractice caps on EMTALA claims in order to
limit those damages awarded under the Act is not provided for under EMTALA
and should not be permitted by those courts empowered to issue rulings under
the Act.
III. ANALYSIS OF EMTALA v. STATE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAw
The issue concerning the applicability of state medical malpractice caps on
damages awarded under EMTALA was created by the language of the statute
itself and its subsequent interpretations by the court system. It is EMTALA's
language, therefore, which should be examined first in order to conduct an
93917 F.2d at 271.
94 See Abercrombie v. Osteopathic Hosp. Founders Ass'n, 950 F.2d 676 (10th Cir. 1991)
(violation of EMTALA's requirements imposes strict liability on a hospital); Gatewood,
933 F.2d at 1041 (EMTALA "not intended to duplicate preexisting legal protections, but
rather to create a new cause of action, generally unavailable under state tort law");
Cleland, 917 F.2d at 266 (determination of compliance under the Act precludes
application of a malpractice standard); Thornton, 895 F.2d at 1131 (cause of action under
EMTALA not analogous to a state medical malpractice claim); Foster v. Lawrence
Memorial Hosp., No. 91-1151-C, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15417 (D. Kan. Sept. 11, 1992)
(misdiagnosis allegation not cognizable under EMTALA); Power v. Arlington Hosp.,
800 F. Supp. 1384 (E.D. Va. 1992) (malpractice claims and EMTALA claims are separate
and distinct causes of action); Woessner v. Freeport Memorial Hosp., No. 91 C 20005,
1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5296 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 1992) (EMTALA not enacted as a federal
malpractice act); Mitchell v. Cander Gen. Hosp., Inc., No. CV 491-258, 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5997 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 2,1992) (a negligent diagnosis constituting malpractice is not
recoverable under the Act); Jones v. Wake County Hosp. Sys., Inc., 786 F. Supp. 538 (E.D.
N.C. 1991) (a hospital acting consistently within its standard screening procedure is not
liable under EMTALA, even if such standard is inadequate under malpractice law);
Coleman v. McCurtain Memorial Medical Management, Inc., 771 F. Supp. 343 (E.D.
Okla. 1991) (defendant motion for summary judgment found to be appropriate for
EMTALA claim and inappropriate for pendent malpractice claim); Petrovics v. Prince
William Hosp. Corp., 764 F. Supp. 415 (E.D. Va. 1991) (claim under EMTALA based on
refusal to treat, not analogous to basis for malpractice claims); Stewart v. Myrick, 731 F.
Supp. 433 (D. Kan. 1990) (case represents a traditional malpractice claim, not a case of
patient dumping); Evitt v. University Heights Hosp., 727 F. Supp. 495 (S.D. Ind. 1989)
(medical malpractice issues may not be adjudicated under EMTALA); Burditt v. US.
Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 934 F.2d 1362 (5th Cir. 1991) (fulfillment of state
transfer requirements does not necessarily fulfill those of EMTALA).
[Vol. 42:171
18https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol42/iss1/7
STATE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CAPS
analysis of this issue intended to reveal the most logical or reasonable
interpretation of the Act, as it relates to these state caps.95
A. Damages Under EMTALA
With respect to private causes of action provided for under EMTALA, an
individual seeking relief may "obtain those damages available for personal injury
under the law of the State in which the hospital is located[.]" 96 This phrase
appears to be straightforward and unambiguous, but it has been broadly
interpreted by some courts as permitting the limitations on awards delineated
in certain state law caps on medical malpractice damages.97 The reasoning
behind such an expanded interpretation of this phrase is explained by the court
in Reid v. Indianapolis Osteopathic Medical Hospital, Inc.98 (later followed by Lee
v. Alleghany Regional Hospital Corp.).99 Although noting that the legislative
history of the Act contains nothing with which to answer the question of
whether the phrase "damages available for personal injury"OO should
incorporate state caps on medical malpractice damages, the Reid court
concluded that the Indiana statute specifically limiting malpractice awards was
applicable to limit EMTALA awards; otherwise, the incorporation clause of
§ 1395dd(d)(2)(A) would be rendered meaningless. 101
In Reid, the state law in question provided a procedural requirement and a
damage limitation to medical malpractice actions. 102 The court determined
that the preemption clause of EMTALA barred the procedural requirement of
the Indiana statute, as it directly conflicted with EMTALA's requirements
concerning the point at which a cause of action under the Act is said to arise.1 03
However, the Reid court concluded that the language of subsection (d)(2)(A),
95See Power, 800 F. Supp. at 1388 ("Since this is a question of statutory interpretation,
it is fundamental that the 'starting point in every case involving construction of a statute
is the language itself'." (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723
(1975))).
9642 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(AHB) (Supp. 1992) (emphasis added).
97See Lee v. University Regional Hosp., Corp., 778 F. Supp. 900 (W.D. Va. 1991)
(language of the Act explicitly incorporates the state medical malpractice cap); Reid v.
Indianapolis Osteopathic Medical Hosp., Inc., 709 F. Supp. 853 (S.D. Ind. 1989)
(EMTALA incorporates the state limitation on damages recoverable from a health care
provider).
98709 F. Supp. 853 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
99778 F. Supp. 900 (W.D. Wa. 1991).
10042 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A) (Supp. 1992).
101709 F. Supp. at 855.
1021d. at 854 (citing IND. CODE 16-9.5-9-2, 16-9.5-2-2(b) (repealed 1993)).
103Id.; see also infra note 116 and accompanying text.
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permitting "those damages available for personal injury," served to incorporate
the substantive state limitation on medical malpractice damages.104
The court arrived at this conclusion by recognizing that (i) the plaintiff in
Reid was "unable to cite a single state with a statute that generally limited
personal injury damages" only;105 (ii) Congress was, at the time EMTALA was
drafted, "clearly aware of a growing concern in some states that excessive
damage awards were fueling a medical malpractice crisis,"106 which had
resulted in the enactment of numerous state laws limiting such damages; and
(iii) Congress, therefore, must have wished to preserve these state caps through
§ 1395dd(d)(2)(A) to limit EMTALA awards as well. 107
In addition, the Reid court chose to incorporate the state medical malpractice
cap on damages awarded pursuant to EMTALAby reasoning that the language
of the Indiana statute provided the only basis for damages "available for
personal injury" in an action against a health care provider.108 This statement
by the court is not entirely accurate, however, as the statute limits awards
against health care providers for occurrences of malpractice and does not
address any other type of action which may be initiated against a health care
provider, such as an EMTALA claim.109
In a more recent interpretation of § 1395dd(d)(2)(A), the court in Power v.
Arlington Hospital110 uncovered the errors of the Reid decision and provided its
own reasoning as to why such state medical malpractice caps are not applicable
to damages awarded under EMTALA. In Power, the issue before the court with
respect to state law was whether to limit the damages previously awarded the
plaintiff to the one million dollar medical malpractice cap of the State of
Virginia.111




108Reid, 709 F. Supp. at 855. The specific language of the Indiana statute to which the
court referred states that a "health care provider ... is not liable for an amount in excess
of one hundred thousand dollars [$100,000] foran occurrence of malpractice." IND. CODE
§ 16-9.5-2-2(b) (repealed 1993).
109Reid, 709 F. Supp. at 855 (quoting IND. CODE § 16-9.5-2-2(b) (repealed 1993)).
110800 F. Supp 1384 (E.D. Va. 1992).
1111d. at 1385. The action involved a British subject living in the United States (without
health insurance) who, when she arrived at the defendant hospital, was unable to walk,
in pain and suffering from chills (later diagnosed as septic shock). Id. at 1386. Her vital
signs and a hip x-ray were taken, along with a urinalysis test. Id. Although doctors were
unable to ascertain the cause of her condition, no additional tests were run and, before
the results of the urinalysis were available, the plaintiff was discharged, still unable to
walk. Power, 800 F. Supp. at 1386. The plaintiff subsequently returned to the defendant
hospital and was then admitted, but her condition had so worsened that her stay lasted
four months, during which time the plaintiff lost both of her legs below the knees and
the sight in one eye. Id. The plaintiff's action against the hospital cited violations of both
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The Power court first examined the language of § 1395dd(d)(2)(A) and read
the phrase "damages available for personal injury" as providing a basis for
recovery under each of the eight personal injury elements reflected in Virginia's
Model Jury Instructions. 112 In so doing, the Power court determined as
significant the fact that not only did the state place no dollar limit on personal
injury damages but, in addition, the EMTALA provision itself contained no
limiting language.113 Specifically, the court noted that the fact that subsection
(d)(2)(A) allows an individual to recover damages "available" for personal
injury and does not, for example, allow "damages for personal injury, except as
may be limited in certain states by medical malpractice statutes," indicates an
intent by Congress not to limit such damages awarded under the Act.114 The
Power court concluded, then, that recovery under EMTALA (in the State of
Virginia) included damages for any of the personal injury elements recognized
by the State but would not be limited to any dollar amount.115
When this reasoning is considered as to the applicability issue concerning
state medical malpractice law, the damages available under a particular state
for personal injury determine the recovery available in a private cause of action
under EMTALA. The reasoning of Reid with respect to its assumption that
Congress, because it was aware of the malpractice insurance crisis at the time
of EMTALA's enactment, intended to preserve the award limits established by
state legislatures is persuasive as well, allowing for a conclusion that recovery
under EMTALA may be limited to the extent such personal injury damages are
limited within a state. However, the Reid court's "jump" in logic, by
incorporating medical malpractice caps to such damages, is unreasonable; such
medical malpractice caps apply to a specific type of tort action within a state
and cannot be interpreted to limit general personal injury damages under
§ 1395dd(d)(2)(A).
the screening and transfer requirements under EMTALA, for which a jury awarded her
five million dollars. See Eleanor Kerlow, Plaintiffs Bar Turns to 'Patient Dumping' Law,
LEGAL TIMEs, Sept. 14, 1992, at 2.
112 Power, 800 F. Supp. at 1388. The court went on to specifically identify these
elements, which referred only to the type of injury sustained, containing no references
to causal conduct. Id.
1131d. at 1388-89.
1141d. at 1389 (quoting Jones v. Wake County Hosp. Sys. Inc., 786 F. Supp. 538, 543
(E.D.N.C. 1991)) (emphasis added). The Power court went on to cite the observation by
the court in Jones, that "had Congress desired to enact a more restrictive statute,
presumably it would have done so." Power, 800 F. Supp. at 1388 (citing Jones, 786 F. Supp.
at 543).
115800 F. Supp. at 1389. In its attempt to cite to authority supporting its interpretation
of EMTALA's recovery language, the Power court uncovered an error in Reid with
respect to state laws which limit general personal injury damages. While the Reid court
determined that since the plaintiff had failed to a cite a single state having general
personal injury caps, Congress must have intended to incorporate medical malpractice
caps in EMTALA's damage provision, Power cites to eight states having enacted such
caps. Id. at 1390 n.16.
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B. Conflicting Statutory Purposes
Section 1395dd(d)(8), the "preemption clause", of EMTALA notes that no
state or local law requirement is preempted by any provision of the Act unless
such local requirement directly conflicts with a requirement of the Act.116 Prior
courts, including the Reid court, have used this provision to preempt
procedural requirements under state laws concerning medical malpractice
actions which they found to conflict with the requirements of EMTALA.1 7
In Reid, the procedural requirement which was ruled to be preempted by
EMTALA was a state law requiring that any action against a health care
provider be brought initially before a review panel before its commencement
in any court. 118 The court determined that, because such a review was required
before an action against a health care provider could arise, a direct conflict
existed with EMTALA's provision that a cause of action arises whenever "any
individual . . . suffers personal harm as a direct result of a participating
hospital's violation of a requirement of this section."119 In addition, the
state-required medical review panel based its findings on a negligence
standard, whereas liability under EMTALA is based on a strict liability
standard, thus further justifying a preemption of such state requirement as any
findings by such panel would be completely irrelevant to a determination
concerning EMTALA.120
The Power court acknowledged this finding by the Reid court and agreed that
the procedural requirement of Indiana's malpractice statute provided an
obstacle which was contrary to EMTALA's purpose and, therefore, should be
preempted. 121 However, the Power court observed that the same reasoning
could be applied to those state laws enacted to limit medical malpractice
damages. In addition to the fact that state caps limiting medical malpractice
damages correspond to a cause of action which is distinct and mutually
exclusive of that arising under EMTALA,122 the statutory purposes of such caps
directly conflict with that of EMTALA.
11642 U.S.C. § 1395dd(f) (1988).
117 See Power, 800 F. Supp. at 1384 (concurring with holdings of other jurisdictions
precluding state procedural laws in EMTALA actions); Reid v. Indianapolis Osteopathic
Medical Hosp., 709 F. Supp. 853 (S.D. Ind. 1989) (preemption of a state requirement that
an action against a hospital must first be brought before a medical review panel is
proper); Smith, 416 S.E.2d at 689 (preemption of state malpractice action notice
provisions is proper).
118709 F. Supp. at 854. A similar requirement was preempted in the Smith court. See
416 S.E.2d at 695.
1 19Reid, 709 F. Supp. at 855 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A)).
1201d.
121Power, 800 F. Supp. at 1390.
122See supra note 94.
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According to EMTALA's legislative history, Congress enacted this statute in
response to its "growing concern about... hospital emergency rooms refusing
to accept or treat patients with emergency conditions. "123 Its purpose remains
that of deterring the conduct proscribed under the Act and compensating the
victims of such conduct.124 The purpose behind the enactment of state laws
limiting medical malpractice damages is completely different. The Power court
examined the medical malpractice cap enacted by the State of Virginia and, as
an example, its purpose is representative of such state caps in general.125 The
purpose of the Virginia medical malpractice cap 126 is to combat the availability
and affordability problems of health care providers with respect to medical
malpractice insurance. 127 It is not concerned with the deterrence of any
proscribed behavior nor the compensation of victims. The application of these
state damage caps arguably conflicts with EMTALA's purposes by (i)
frustrating the desired deterrent effect of damages against those hospitals
found to be in violation of its requirements, and (ii) limiting the compensation
available to its victims. 128 In this respect, the preemption provision of
§ 1395dd(f) should serve to prohibit the application of state medical
malpractice caps.
Although reported authority concerning this issue is sparse, the reasoning
of authority discussed in Part II of this Note concerning the overall
interpretation of EMTALA is helpful. As previously noted, the cause of action
created under EMTALA is "a new cause of action, generally unavailable under
state tort law.... "129 Even though the courts have disagreed as to how strictly
or liberally EMTALA should be interpreted with respect to the issue of whether
EMTALA is fundamentally a federal malpractice act, the courts have
consistently agreed that a cause of action under EMTALA is not a medical
malpractice action, but one that addresses specific requirements of health care
providers while imposing a strict liability standard.130
A review of the leading opinions of Gatewood and Cleland, which have served
to establish the general basis for recovery under the Act, indicate as much. It is
the emphasis with which each of these cases notes the separateness of an
123H.R. REP. No. 241, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 at 27 (1985), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 597, 605; see also supra note 4.
124Power, 800 F. Supp. at 1389.
125 See id. at 1389-90.
1261d. at 1387 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-58.15 (Michie Supp. 1992)).
1271d. (citing J. OF THE HOUSE OF DEL., Mar. 13,1976, at 1076).
128Power, 800 F. Supp. at 1390-91. In support of its preemption determination, the
Power court cites Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. F.C.C., 476 U.S. 355, 368-69 (1986)
(preemption of a state law is permitted if such law stands as an obstacle to the attainment
of the goals and purposes of the federal law in question).
12 9Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037,1041 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
13 0See cases cited supra note 94.
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EMTALA claim from state malpractice claims, as well as their loyalty to the text
of the statute itself, which permits the inference that, faced with the issue of
whether a state medical malpractice cap should limit damages awarded under
EMTALA, the holding of the Power court would be followed by both the District
of Columbia Circuit in Gatewood and the Sixth Circuit in Cleland.13 1
The Gatewood court provides the most emphatic language from which to
draw this inference in its opinion concerning the difference between local
malpractice law and EMTALA. 132 Initially, Gatewood acknowledged that
EMTALA does not provide recovery for emergency room negligence or
malpractice when it ruled that questions relating to the diagnosis of the patient
"remain the exclusive province of local negligence and malpractice law."133 The
court's analysis continued to clarify its interpretation of EMTALA and how it
relates to state medical malpractice law.134 Gatewood noted the differences in
the conduct addressed by each type of law and refused to incorporate a
malpractice or negligence standard into the requirements of subsection (a) of
the Act.135
With respect to Gatewood's interpretation of EMTALA's text, the court's
holding that the statutorial phrase "any individual" failed to limit recovery
solely to the indigent and uninsured patients for which, as the court
acknowledged, EMTALA was enacted, is also indicative of the court's
presumable findings regarding the applicability of state medical malpractice
caps to claims under the Act.136 Gatewood's conclusion that EMTALA provides
a cause of action separate and apart from malpractice law, in conjunction with
its somewhat literal interpretation of the text of the Act, establishes a
foundation for such reasonable inference to be drawn that state medical
malpractice caps would not be incorporated into the "damages available for
personal injury" provision of EMTALA. 137
Although the decision in Cleland does not clearly indicate the court's opinion
concerning the applicability of state medical malpractice caps, an analysis of
its discussion regarding what provides the basis for claims under EMTALA as
opposed to state malpractice laws also supports a conclusion that such caps
would be preempted by the court.138 Perhaps the strongest indication of this
131 For a discussion of the holding in Power, see supra notes 110-115, 121-128, and
accompanying text.
132See generally Gatewood, 933 F.2d 1037.
133 d. at 1039. This statement was made by the court in expressing its agreement with
such earlier determination by the federal district court.
1341d.; see supra notes 92 and 94.
135933 F.2d at 1040-41.
136Id. at 1041.
13 7 See id. at 1040-41; 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A) (Supp. 1992).
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is found in the court's dicta with respect to the Act's definition of the term
"appropriate."139 Specifically, the Cleland court noted that, in reference to the
medical screening required to be performed by a hospital, the Act's use of the
qualifying phrase "within its capabilities" precluded the resort to a malpractice
or other objective standard of care in determining what constituted an
"appropriate" screening. 140
In addition, however, Cleland interprets the language of subsection (f) of
EMTALA as specifically negating preemption of any malpractice claims joined
with an EMTALA claim. 141 This interpretation, along with the court's
preclusion of a malpractice standard as noted above, arguably invokes a
preemption of state medical malpractice caps when the language of subsection
(d)(2)(A) of the Act is subjected to the court's preemption reasoning. 142
Although such preemption would appear to be negated by the Cleland court, a
following of the "plain words" of subsection (f) (EMTALA's preemption clause)
would "lead to an absurd result" with respect to the "plain language" of
subsection (d)(2)(A) (EMTALA's enforcement clause), thus providing a basis
for the court to allow a preemption of state medical malpractice caps under the
Act. 143
Based on these analyses, as an EMTALA cause of action is deemed to be
mutually exclusive of state medical malpractice actions, it cannot be limited by
the provisions of a state medical malpractice cap. Just as such a cap would not
be applicable to damages awarded under a cause of action for breach of
contract, for example, neither should it be applicable to damages awarded
under EMTALA. Each cause of action deals with separate and distinct conduct
providing the basis for recovery and it is illogical to incorporate a state law
limiting damages awarded for a specific type of action to a federal law
addressing different conduct held to a separate standard of liability by those
courts in granting relief.
IV. CONCLUSION
Patient dumping continues to be a serious problem in the United States
nearly eight years after EMTALA's enactment. In 1991, it was estimated from
statistics contained in the New England Journal of Medicine that approximately
1391d. at 272.
14Od.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (Supp. 1992).
141917 F.2d at 270. The Cleland court offers support for its conclusion by citing
numerous authorities that suggest that courts should follow the plain words of the
statute so long as it does not lead to an absurd result. Id.
142 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A) (Supp. 1992) (an individual may obtain those
damages "available for personal injury" in the State in which the hospital is located).
143 See supra notes 141 and 142.
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250,000 patient dumping incidents occur each year in American hospitals.144
In contrast, the Department of Health and Human Services had identified only
140 hospitals as having violated the Act, penalizing only 19 of these
offenders.145
These statistics indicate a nearly complete failure on the part of EMTALA to
effectively address patient dumping, contravening the intent of Congress in
1986. Congressional attempts to resolve the patient dumping problem,
however, did not begin with the enactment of EMTALA. As early as 1946, the
Hill-Burton Act 146 provided the incentive of federal funding to hospitals for
their construction and modernization, as long as the hospital agreed to provide
care (including emergency medical care) to certain indigent patients. 147 This
act, too, was found to be an inadequate solution and hospitals, under the
ever-increasing pressure to cut costs and increase profit margins, brought
patient dumping to its highest level ever during the mid-1980's. 148
The magnitude of this problem suggests that Congress alone cannot alleviate
patient dumping by hospitals. Approximately 25 states, in fact, have enacted
their own statutes in response to this growing problem 149 and a report by the
Public Citizen's Health Research Group ("Public Citizen") credits these local
enactments with the tremendous variation in statistics concerning the
enforcement of EMTALA throughout the country.150
The decisions of the judicial system regarding EMTALA cases provide
additional assistance to the enforcement of the Act. So long as the courts remain
split with respect to its liability and enforcement provisions, EMTALA will
remain an ineffective attempt to address this critical health care issue.
Recommendations offered by Public Citizen include the use of a broader
scope of penalties in EMTALA's enforcement, in order to create a "clear finan-
144Public Citizen Calls HHS' Enforcement of Patient Dumping Act "Tragic Failure," [1991]
DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA) No. 79, at A-14 (Apr. 24, 1991) [hereinafter HHS'
Enforcenent].
1451d.
146 Hospital Survey & Construction (Hill-Burton) Act, Pub. L. No. 79-725,60 Stat. 1040
(1946) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 291. (1988)); see Treiger, supra note 3; see also
Stricker, Jr., supra note 28.
1 4 71d.
14 81d.
14 9See Stricker, Jr., supra note 28, at 1124-26 n.16.
150HHS' Enforcement, supra note 144, at A-14. The violations of EMTALA identified
by the regional offices of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services range from
zero in Regions I and II (which include New York, New Jersey and Massachusetts) to
sixty-seven in Region VI (including Texas, which contains fifty-two of the sixty-seven
violations reported). Id. Of these states, only New York and Texas have enacted laws
prohibiting the denial by a hospital of emergency medical treatment to indigents or
uninsured. See supra note 149.
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cial deterrent" to those hospitals found to be in violation of the Act 151 An
amendment to EMTALA by Congress which would specifically prohibit the
application of state medical malpractice caps to damages awarded under the
Act would provide such recommended deterrent. The analysis presented in
Part III of this Note provides support for the suggestion that such an
amendment would be proper.
Although the differences in interpretations of EMTALAby the federal courts
have lessened the Act's overall effectiveness, EMTALA remains the most direct
attempt yet by Congress to provide necessary medical treatment for its citizens.
Until such additional actions are taken by Congress, either by amendments to
EMTALA or through the enactment of additional health care reforms, the Act's
overall interpretation by the judiciary will determine the future assurance of
emergency medical treatment in the United States.
AMY J. McKrIcK
15 1HHS' Enforcenmnt, supra note 144, at A-14.
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